

V. 16 Sep 75

E G Y P T

D 1

AS-SADAT ADDRESSES ASU SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 1849 GMT 15 Sep 75 LD

[Speech made by Egyptian President Anwar as-Sadat at meeting with ASU and Trade Union leaders at ASU premises in Cairo on 15 September--live]

[Text] Brothers and sisters, as we meet today we mark the anniversary of a great and glorious day--10 Ramadan. It is our duty on this day to salute with pride our heroes in the armed forces [applause] who continue to bear their arms in readiness. It is also our duty to exalt our noble martyrs--"they are living with their lord, by him provided" [Koran] Let us greet our soldiers and officers and express confidence in them and gratitude for their efforts. It was they who made a noble life possible for themselves and for their nation. They gave us hope by exploding the myth [of Israel's invincibility] and by laying the foundations of victory.

Brothers and sisters, ASU secretaries are meeting today for the first time since their election. The meeting also includes, for the first time, representatives of professional, workers and farmers trade unions. This means that we have moved on from the stage of a closed political organization to that of an open political organization. Popular councils will soon be set up throughout the country by election. This is yet another step on the road to democracy and a leap forward toward the realization of local government through the people themselves. We pin great hopes on this step.

The alliance of the working forces of all the people has, therefore, been achieved today. This principle is now being applied on the largest possible scale and in the most democratic manner.

Going back to 10 Ramadan, I say that today, 2 years after those historic moments, the effects of the decision we took are brighter and clearer, and its far-reaching reflections manifest themselves in our life and the life of the Arab nation and the entire world. This is particularly so since we are now reaping once more fruit of 10 Ramadan with the beginning of the second Israeli withdrawal in Sinai. [applause] In a few weeks time, God willing, the Israelis will withdraw from the strategic passes, cease to control an important part of our oil wealth, and retreat from most of the eastern coast of the Gulf of Suez. Our triumphant banners will fly there again.

You undoubtedly know about the storms which some have tried to raise in various parts of the Arab world. Statements are being issued, prearranged demonstrations are being staged, and accusations are being leveled at random. Although the sources and motives may differ, they have all surpassed the limits of acceptable dialog and serious discussion, and have sunk to low and trivial levels with a complete lack of sense of responsibility regarding the most serious moment in the history of our Arab nation and the nation's cause.

Perhaps, these stormraisers thought they could intimidate us or compel us to follow a different course from the one we are following, or at least they thought they could disturb us. But no, nothing of this sort has happened or will happen. [applause] I repeat, nothing of the sort has happened or will happen.

We are not boasting, but are saying this because we are satisfied that we are respecting our responsibility toward the supreme national interest and that we couple words with deeds and do not deceive or mislead or make unreasonable claims. What we have faced up to and realized is part of what we have taken upon ourselves and announced.

As I have frequently said, we do not speak two languages, one for the closed meetings and one for the microphones. We do not use two faces, one face for local public opinion and one for world public opinion. The storms which were brought on lose their momentum quickly because they emanate from secondary motives, from a parochial struggle, attempts to make small gains and from a mentality which lacks understanding of the world and indeed, our Arab nation. The Arab nation after its difficult experience, has become a mature nation, which cannot easily be deceived by one upmanship or by glossy slogans. The stormraisers do not realize that they fail to understand the awakening of the Arab nation which now comprehends the motives of this or that party.

I wish to assure you--and the Egyptian Arab people should be sure--that the vast majority of the Arab public opinion is with us and that the Arab conscience appreciates our efforts and sacrifices. To say, as the stormraisers do, that Egypt is isolated, is ridiculous and pitiful. We are following our own course. We see that their defective ammunition is dwindling quickly because their ammunition is talk, whereas our ammunition, which is not running out, is continuous action.

We shall once again try to tolerate the rashness and delusions of the representatives of the Palestinian people themselves. I shall once again repeat what I have said before, I shall once again tell the entire Arab nation that the time has come to present clear facts, not only to our patient and faithful people, but to the entire Arab nation so as to confront this deception and delusion. I say that we shall once again try to tolerate the rashness and delusion of the representatives of the Palestinian people themselves, even though we have been sincere with them throughout.

Our attitude toward the Palestine problem, which is the crux of the Arab-Israeli struggle, will not change as a result of any provocation. This is because we do not think as a party or in a party mentality, as an organization or as part of an organization, but think of the higher interests of the 3 million Palestinian people who are now listening and to whom, before the rest of the Arab countries, I wish to tell the truth about the situation.

We struggled in Rabat to get the PIO recognized as the representative of the Palestinian people. We said quite frankly that the struggle to restore the rights of the Palestinian people would be the struggle of a generation, a cause that would inspire us to draw up successful strategies. We said and stressed that the Palestinians should express themselves with their own free will, that we are not their trustees and would not act on their behalf in any matter.

If, however, we were to be asked our opinions and views, we would say we believe in the need to establish a liberated Palestinian homeland, capable of shouldering its responsibilities. Then we would all support this nation. This is our historical commitment that has not changed in the least, nor have we ever lost sight of it; it is constantly on our mind.

V. 16 Sep 75

D 3

EGYPT

When tendentious people spread rumors that there are certain secret clauses in the recent agreement, we openly challenged them to produce evidence of one such clause. There is a story behind this which I shall relate to you and to the entire Arab nation. They found no evidence and could only cite statements made by Israeli statesmen, statements which are deliberately contradictory for local consumption. I have often warned of this.

One of the most ridiculous measures to which these stormraisers resorted was a naive attempt to discriminate between the Egyptian people and their leadership and to find a crack in the domestic Egyptian front. In this they deceived no one but themselves. Their tactics boomeranged when the national home front, with all its currents and colors, stood firm and united.

Brothers and sisters, from this rostrum I will tell everyone frankly, this frankness may be painful, that what concerns the Arab nation is inter-Arab cooperation, but what concerns the Egyptian homeland is the welfare of the people of this homeland. [applause] I repeat what concerns the Arab nation is inter-Arab cooperation, but what concerns the Egyptian homeland is the welfare of the people of this homeland, since in exercising our national sovereignty, we are not buying anything at the expense of other people's rights and we do not accept anything that would hinder the comprehensive Arab march.

We do not want to close the bridges that are open, nor do we want to refuse an outstretched hand. Our minds and hearts are open to dialog. But the final judgment, as far as we are concerned, must be ours. Let this be clear to all.

At the beginning of my speech, I promised to talk about 10 Ramadan, 1973. I had intended to try to sum up what happened on that day and what followed. I was hoping to concentrate on celebrating the fact that you have gained the people's confidence in the elections, while facing a completely new phase of political developments. Perhaps by studying the events of that time, you would have been able to draw your own conclusions as to how we should act in the future. I am making facts clear at this meeting to our people and to the Arab nation, although I would rather have kept these facts secret, or at least most of them, as all mature and vigilant people do. However, the accusations and events, and particularly what happened today, make it clear that I must reveal at least some of the facts.

Today, as you have heard on the news, our embassy in Madrid was attacked by 5 Palestinians. Some reports say that they are led by an Iraqi and the rest are Palestinians; other reports say that two of them are from Al-Fatah. Other reports say that when the Fatah representative entered the building, he was detained.

As you know I have formed a committee made up of the vice president, the prime minister, and the foreign minister. The foreign minister is now following the situation carefully. Therefore he has not been able to attend this meeting with us.

You have, of course, heard about the demands of those who entered the embassy and detained the ambassador and two Egyptian diplomats as hostages. They have demanded the withdrawal of the Egyptian military group from Geneva with a declaration that the agreement is treason to the Arab nation and the Egyptian people.

V. 16 Sep 75

D 4

EGYPT

The latest reports I have--I know that you are eager to hear what is happening--indicate that in their negotiations with certain Arab ambassadors, from Kuwait, Iraq, and Algeria, the terrorists requested that a statement be issued denouncing the agreement. They first demanded that this should be done at a press conference. The Arab ambassadors refused. So they asked for a statement to be issued denouncing the agreement. The diplomats told them that if this is what they wanted, we would give them a statement.

An Algerian plane was also demanded, so that the terrorists could travel together with the 3 hostages and 2 of the Arab ambassadors. The Algerian Government's reply was that it deplores this action, but that if we, our government, and the Spanish Government should request a plane from them, they would be prepared to provide one. I agreed to the request and sent my consent to President Boumediene immediately before coming here. This is the latest news about today's incident.

Let us go back to talking about 10 Ramadan. Perhaps we may find the key to this fluid situation. As you have heard, on 10 Ramadan 2 years ago, at 1400, our armed forces began the attack on Sinai, first by an air strike and second by crossing the canal. Within 6 hours the course of the battle was clear and the Israelis were seen to be caught off balance. In these 6 hours most of the forces which were supposed to complete the crossing during the night had already completed their crossing, raised the flag and stormed the Bar-Lev line. [applause] As you have already heard and know, I was at the operations room from the very beginning of the action. I received a communication. They contacted me at the operations room saying that the Soviet ambassador had requested an urgent meeting. As I said, in 6 hours the picture was clear, 4 hours later it was even clearer and 6 hours later it was crystal clear.

I left the operations room and went to the headquarters which I had prepared at the At-Tahirah palace. There I met with the Soviet ambassador only 6 hours after the beginning of the operation. What message was the Soviet ambassador carrying? The Soviet ambassador told me that he had a message from the three Soviet leaders. The message was: Syria has asked for a cease-fire. He wanted to know our view on this and indeed the Soviet Government was also asking us to agree to a cease-fire. I told the Soviet ambassador: I am sorry. We are not going to cease fire until after we achieve the objectives of our battle. As for Syria, allow me to ask President Hafiz al-Asad to confirm whether he has uttered these words or not, because this is not what we agreed.

The agreement between us was, and this is being said publicly for the first time, that I would summon the Soviet ambassador on Wednesday 3 October and that he would summon the Soviet ambassador in Damascus on Thursday 4 October. The message I was to convey to the Soviet Union on Wednesday was supposed to be: Egypt and Syria have decided to embark on a military operation to put an end to the no peace, no war situation. The question I was to pose in the message was: What is the opinion of the Soviet Government regarding this offensive?

I did in fact summon the Soviet ambassador. I summoned him on Wednesday 3 October and informed him of the situation. He asked me: When is the offensive to be? I told him that President al-Asad and I had not yet decided on the zero hour.

V. 16 Sep 75

D 5

LBYFR

Why? Because President al-Asad and I had agreed in August 1973 in Bludan that he would tell the Russians the time of the operation on Thursday 4 October. I would just ask the Soviet Government what its attitude to the action would be. So when the Soviet ambassador asked when the offensive was to be, I told him we had not yet agreed on the zero hour, but that I wanted a reply to my question. What is, what attitude would the Soviet Union adopt.

As agreed, Al-Asad summoned the Soviet ambassador in Damascus on Thursday and told him of the time of the offensive. This was all as we had agreed. When the Soviet ambassador came to see me on 6 October, he told me that Hafiz al-Asad had summoned the Soviet ambassador and told him the day of the offensive. I told him I was aware of this as it was part of the plan we had agreed on. The ambassador told me that the Soviet Union wanted a cease-fire after 48 hours. I told him that I would have to discuss this with President Hafiz al-Asad. He said that he wanted to know Egypt's position. So I told him: Tell your government that we will not cease fire until we have achieved the aims of our battle. The Soviet ambassador was not satisfied. He told me: [words indistinct] I must officially inform you that President Hafiz al-Asad is our partner. So I told him that this is why I must be sure to consult with President Hafiz as no stipulations of this nature were part of our agreement. The Soviet ambassador then left.

I forgot to tell you that on Wednesday when I summoned the ambassador and gave him the message he asked to meet me on Thursday. He came on Thursday. I told him he could come in at once. It was Thursday. I thought it was impossible--a reply in 24 hours, while sometimes years pass without my ever receiving a reply on anything. It was impossible. The world must have changed. Indeed 10 minutes at most after he asked to meet me he was at my home. I was expecting him to bring a reply to my question or message as to the attitude of the Soviet Government. He said: I am bringing an urgent message. I said: What is it? He said: The Soviet Government will send four large transport planes to you tomorrow, Friday 3 October, and the government asks your personal approval for them to land at a military airport to evacuate Soviet citizens. I told him: I agree. I have no objections.

So four planes arrived on Friday. The Jews noticed them and told America that these were reinforcements. They did not know that the four big planes were empty and were to evacuate families. They thought they were bringing supplies. I told him: Good. I agree, and the military airport west of Cairo can be used, to avoid landing at a civil airport. But what is the reply to my question regarding the attitude of the Soviet Government? He said: This is still under consideration.

After he had conveyed the message to us on Saturday, he left. Then I sent a message to President Hafiz al-Asad. A copy of this message has already been published and it will certainly be published again tomorrow. I told Al-Asad what had happened and that the Soviet ambassador had come to me and informed me of matters on his behalf. I told him that Egypt's stand was to refuse a cease fire until the objectives of the battle had been achieved. 6 October--10 Ramadan--had gone by and 7 October came--11 Ramadan. That afternoon I was told that the Soviet ambassador wanted to meet me. I was in Cairo, I did not go to the operations room. The operation was underway and there was no need for me to sit with the commanders in the operations rooms since everyone was performing his duty.

V. 16 Sep 75

D 6

EGYPT

The Soviet ambassador came to see me on the afternoon of 7 October. Half an hour before he arrived, I received President Hafiz al-Asad's message rejecting a cease-fire. I was astonished because it took almost 24 hours to come, when the situation was serious. I had sent my message the previous night, and received the answer the following afternoon. He said that he had made no such agreement [with the Soviet Union]. Well, if he had not, he had not. I believed him because if he had it would have been contrary to our agreement.

Half an hour later the Soviet ambassador came to see me. I told him he had come at the right time because half an hour ago I had received a message from President al-Asad. What he had told me yesterday was entirely wrong and did not happen--it was not true. The Soviet ambassador turned pale. He said: I am bringing you a second request from Syria through the Soviet leadership for a cease-fire.

I was extremely angry and told the ambassador: Consider the matter closed, because I consider President al-Asad's word on the subject as final. He tried to broach the subject with me once again but I refused. I said I was not prepared to listen to him. I had sent a message to Syria and al-Asad had said no, which meant no. The Soviet ambassador then left. But before he left I told him: Tell your government today--that was the second day of the war, 7 October or 11 Ramadan--that this is a long-term battle, a battle of tanks. The one who has most tanks and who can last the longest will win. I do not need tanks now but tell your government that I will need supplies for tanks as soon as possible. The ambassador then left.

As you know, on 13 October the British ambassador woke me up at dawn with the report that Kissinger had informed them that the Soviet leaders had told him I had agreed to a cease-fire. So Kissinger sent a message through Britain--since at that time there were no contacts between us. Our relations were broken. He sent a message through the British ambassador and British prime minister and the then foreign secretary. The ambassador woke me up at dawn and asked me whether this was true, so that the United States could help bring about a cease-fire. I said nothing of the sort had happened and I related to him the story of the two meetings with the Soviet ambassador on 6 and 7 October. I told him that we were not going to agree to a cease-fire until we had achieved the objectives of our battle.

Soviet Premier Kosygin then flew to Egypt and also asked me to halt the firing. He reiterated what the Soviet ambassador had said--that they had received more than two requests from Syria for a cease-fire. I said I was sorry because I had already written to Hafiz al-Asad and he had replied to me, and, therefore, I was not ready to discuss the matter any further. I was not prepared to agree to a cease-fire until the objectives of the battle were achieved.

The lines were breached while Kosygin was here. He tried to use this to exert pressure on me. I told him this was not a theoretical battle; five divisions were on the east bank and not one man would be withdrawn, and that my tanks were on the east bank and I would be dealing with the west bank. Talk about the Israelis being on the way to Cairo was sheer nonsense. When the Soviet premier left I was still refusing to call a cease-fire. This was the situation until 19 October.

I went to the command after midnight on the advice of Commander in Chief Field Marshal Isma'il, may God have mercy on his soul.

V. 16 Sep 70

Our chief of staff returned. I had sent him 3 days earlier to clear up a crucial problem. He failed and came back suffering a nervous breakdown. Field Marshal Isma'il told me that I had to go and see the situation for myself. All the commanders were around me. Husni, Al-Jamasi and the rest. I took my decision on 19 October and said that there was nothing at all which called for this nervous collapse of the chief of staff. So that night I fired the chief of staff and appointed Al-Jamasi as of 19 October as chief of staff. I told Isma'il: Do not announce this to the forces or the world because Israel will gloat unnecessarily since they are the ones who make changes in their commands and not us.

By that night in particular, I had been confronting the United States for 10 days. The United States took up a base in Al-'Arish, immediately behind my lines [as heard]. Quite clearly it built up a base and began landing supplies in Al-'Arish so that they would reach the front in the shortest possible time. Of course, everything was at the service of Israel. After that, I learned that a U.S. satellite was taking pictures daily. When one of our armored divisions moved from the west to the east in response to Syria's request for us to step up our military action along our front to ease pressure on Syria, the Americans photographed this and passed it on to the Israelis. The operation to open the breach was planned at that time. All of this talk is contained in Elazar's memoirs. I do not need to explain this to anyone. The dismissed Israeli chief of staff said this in his memoirs. By the 19th I found myself fighting the United States for 10 days on the battlefield.

The United States threw in all its weight. The Soviet Union was after me [waraya]. It had not forgotten the decision regarding expelling the experts. I wholeheartedly welcomed Kosygin's visit during the battle. I told him that this is the spirit and here we can begin our true relations and forget the past; I said that this will be the basis of true relations between us. He tried to brag to me about what they were sending. I told him not to brag because I crossed the canal with bridges from World War II. I crossed the largest water barrier in history with bridges from World War II--the Soviet Union had not given me anything else. It took 5 hours to assemble one bridge. The bridges were put in place and I crossed and removed the 17-meter sand barrier--all this in less than 6 hours; all my forces crossed, all the bridges were put in place and the tanks moved in. It was a miracle.

I told him: No. The new bridge that you have, the (PND), which can be assembled in 30 minutes, you have refused to give me. You gave me the one that takes 5 hours and I accepted it. I carried out my operation and crossed almost without loss.

The Soviets had estimated that 40,000 to 60,000 would be killed in the canal crossing. This is official and we have it with their signature. Our losses in the crossing did not exceed 400, with the 5-hour bridges from World War II. I must say this so that the people will realize what our armed forces have accomplished. [applause] What glory!

Despite all this I was very eager and I told him that this is the time and method to embark on new relations--with a new understanding, forgetting the past. However, I did not agree to a ceasefire and I did not agree to the Soviet Union speaking for us because I said long ago that Egypt, not the Soviet Union, speaks for Egypt. [applause] He went away, angry of course.

V. 16 Sep 75

D 8

EGYPT

Such was the situation on 19 October when the United States had a base on my [Israeli-occupied] territory, and with the Soviet Union pressing me, I had to make a decision. I made the decision on the 19th at 0200 that night. I decided that I would agree to a cease-fire at the present lines with the guarantee of the two super-powers on the basis of the immediate implementation of resolution 242--exactly as stipulated in the resolution.

The first thing I did was send a message at 0200 to President Hafiz al-Asad in Syria. In the message I explained the situation to him and told him that I had made a decision right then for a cease-fire because I was not fighting America. I said I was prepared to account for this decision before my own people and before the entire Arab nation, but I was not prepared to sacrifice my people, my soil or the Egyptian Army as actually happened in 1967. [applause] The message is known and was published. [words indistinct]

From this point we start a new strange phase that has the effect of shedding light on today's stands and on the deliberate misinformation put in front of the Arab man in the street. You know what happened after the cease-fire. I asked for the cease-fire and 2 days later on the 22d the Ba'th Party was still deliberating the question. It debated the question 2 days to decide whether or not to have a cease-fire. The Syrian Ba'th Party then told the Arab nation that it was as-Sadat who asked for a cease-fire and lost the battle of the Arabs and that Syria was preparing a counteroffensive and that Syria was continuing the battle.

All right, where was Syria then and where were we? Now the situation is clear and known. Why was the Arab nation told--and I was compelled to publish my cable to him on the 19th--that the Syrians were not notified of the cease-fire and that I adopted the decision alone, while they had no information and were surprised by the cease-fire on the 22nd, when he had the message at dawn on 19th--and I had to publish it--on the 19th at 0200. The Arab nation was told that it was As-Sadat who asked for a cease-fire; it was Egypt which halted the battle--I who stood alone confronting the United States for 10 days and, in spite of the fact that it was the United States, I halted at line 22, which was fatal for Israel by their admission and the admission of Kassar himself. Our armed forces stopped them on line 22 and that is why they seized the opportunity 2 hours after the cease-fire and they carried out their advance with the object of gaining something because line 22 in the west was worse than their positions in the east.

We kept silent and said we would leave it to history; but the Ba'th Party came up to say that it was As-Sadat who asked for a cease-fire, it was he who lost the battle of the Arab nation. This was the beginning of the maneuvers, outbiddings, and the stage plays which are performed for the Arab nation nowadays, which I spoke to you about today.

It has been proved that I sent him a cable on the 19th 3 days before--explaining the matter to him and telling him that I agreed to the cease-fire with my heart bleeding because I was not prepared to shoulder historically the responsibility of destroying Egypt's armed forces again and sacrifice my sons and people once more. I was fighting the United States and I am not equal to it. I am not one of those who boasts of one-upmanship; I do not fight the United States. I fight Israel, but not the United States.

This was the first stage play presented to the Arab nation. I replied to him in a message sent to him on 19 October. But the stage plays did not stop on December 1973 after the cease-fire came.

V. 16 Sep 75

D 9

EGYPT

No, I was gathering all the leadership with me; the plan for liquidating the enclave was laid. I approved the plan. I appointed a commander to the enclave separate from the commanders of the armies. Everything was ready, awaiting only the order of implementation. Kissinger came in December. Earlier in November he came to me and we worked out the six points. He came to me in December. I told him: I want to know the stand of the United States when I liquidate the enclave because I do not care about anyone's position except that of the United States. He said: We oppose you with all the strength of the United States because we will not let American weapons be defeated twice. Well [I said]: What about the enclave? He said: The cease-fire line of 22 October is included in the six points, and it will be decided within the framework of disengagement. Before coming to you I brought a plan from the Pentagon showing what forces you have in front of the enclave and what the Israeli forces are; we know the situation. It will be a massacre. We know it will be a massacre, but we shall oppose you. However, within the framework of disengagement these people will go east because they are indeed in a predicament at present, being in the west. But before we disengaged, President Hafiz al-Asad came to me, before Kissinger came in December--President Hafiz al-Asad came to me--and we agreed that when Kissinger came he should work out the disengagement agreement of which, as I said, I had informed Hafiz al-Asad in November. This was, as far as Egypt is concerned, that the Israelis should withdraw to the east [of the canal] and, with regard to Syria, that they should withdraw to a line beyond Al-Qunaytirah. Boumediene witnessed all this because when we went to Algiers for the summit meeting I related this to Boumediene and he is a witness with me. When Al-Asad came to me in December I told him that Kissinger would come to Egypt and of course would go to Syria. He said: All right. I told him that he would talk in Geneva because we asked to convene the Geneva conference; the conference was expected to be convened in December. He said: What is your opinion? I told him that in my opinion we should go to Geneva because we are not the ones to be afraid of Geneva. Israel should fear Geneva. He agreed and asked if the United States would secure the disengagement for us before Geneva. I told him that when Kissinger comes I will tell him of course.

Kissinger then came to me and I asked him the question I told you about. He replied to me. I told him: Will you not implement disengagement on the two fronts before Geneva? He said: I promised you but I cannot do that before January. He explained to me the circumstances and I was convinced by them. I said to him all right, let it be so. He said: What is your opinion about Geneva. I said to him: We will go. There is nothing to that. I do not fear Geneva. The one who fears Geneva is Israel.

So I declared I would go to a Geneva conference. He then went to Syria. After we had declared that we would go to Geneva, Syria suddenly declared that it would not go to Geneva. I asked why. They said because we have not yet brought about a disengagement on the two fronts, and we had agreed to do this before going to Geneva. Well, was the matter up to me? It was up to the third party--that is Kissinger and not me. He was the one who could (?finish) in December or January. He said give me till January and then I will begin the operation. It was not a failure on my part. The party which could achieve this said it could not be ready before 5 January.

V. 16 Sep 75

D 11

EGYPT

But when Syria came to the Geneva meeting and participated in it, it was established that there was no such agreement, disengagement or anything of the sort. When the January operation began, they again raised an uproar with the Arab nation. Then Kissinger was coming and going to Aswan to see me in connection with the first agreement. This went on until the first agreement was reached. It was signed on a Friday.

On Friday morning the good man Ahmad al-Khatib, prime minister of the confederation which binds us to Syria and Libya, came to see me. He is a member of the Ba'th Party command--member of the higher command. In other words, he is not a junior official.

[Words indistinct] he came to me in Aswan early on Friday. On that day I was expecting Kissinger to arrive from Israel because the signing was to take place at noon on kilometer 101. At the time of the signing we were expected to be sitting together and after that I was planning to begin a tour of the Arab world. Indeed after the signing on Friday I did leave immediately for the Arab countries and began my tour.

Al-Khatib came to me Friday morning and told me the situation might worsen and that you--with your wisdom--together with your partners and colleagues could settle these matters. I told him: I am not doing anything objectionable. You have been aware of this since November and there is agreement on the two lines--the disengagement line in Egypt and the line in Syria. This was known to President Hafiz al-Asad and President Boumedienne, at whose place we met in November. That was in January. What is the need for all this? I understood from him that Syria gave instructions that if this agreement is signed every Syrian here is to withdraw, including the Syrian Embassy and the officials of the federal government. Everybody. I told him: I am sorry. I will sign the agreement that day. That was all. Kissinger was on his way. I told him that Kissinger was on the way. He said: Well come and talk to President Hafiz al-Asad. Let us call him from Aswan. I said: Let it be so and we called President Hafiz al-Asad. While I was talking to him Kissinger came in. I told him: [words indistinct]. I spoke with President Hafiz and told him that Brother al-Khatib has conveyed to me so and so. For your information I am going to sign the agreement today and a disengagement will take place on your side--the line I spoke to you about here and the line on your side [words indistinct].

He said: Postpone it. I told him: Not for a single moment. I only ask one question: Is this true? This will mean a breaking of relations. If this is so I am making plans to be with you tomorrow. If this talk is true then [word indistinct] if this was not true then I will sign today. He said: No, we have not made a decision on that and I am awaiting you tomorrow. The next day, Saturday, I did go and met at Damascus airport with the National Front, which includes the Ba'th Party and the other parties. I explained my position. Brother Sayyid Mar'i was with me. We held a meeting at the airport and I explained everything to them.

Then came the new stage play--Egypt concluded a disengagement agreement and quit the battle, leaving Syria alone. Oh Arabs! Syria is alone. Egypt did so and so. Then they said: A war of attrition. Syria is alone and is waging a war of attrition.

v. 16 Sep 75

D 12

EGYPT

After all this a disengagement of forces on the Syrian front took place along the lines I had indicated to President al-Asad in November. It was all over and the situation then calmed down. However, until this was achieved it was circulated that Syria was engaged in a war of attrition, that it stood alone in the battle, and that Egypt had deserted the battlefield. Disgusting. Again, it was disgusting. This was being presented to the Arab nation, although this time the Arab nation did not believe it. Why? Because the Arabs knew that progress was being made and that a disengagement was on the way--and, indeed, a disengagement did take place. Yet another theatrical show. Everything was directed against Egypt. I really do not understand. Is it our fault that we refuse to let the situation reach a deadlock and go back to the "no peace, no war" state of affairs? Is it because of this that we are being accused of these things?

All right, I concede that the Syrian Ba'th Party has domestic troubles. But why drag the national cause into these domestic troubles. We all have domestic troubles. After that Nixon came to visit us here. We agreed that the following step would take place in September 1974--the step which actually took place in September 1975. This second step was still another disengagement of forces on the two fronts--the Egyptian and the Syrian. Nixon left for Israel and made speeches. He conveyed to them in Israel what we agreed upon. He then started to prepare in silence. I decided that this time I would not reply to any accusations. Enough. We had had enough theatrical shows. Still it hurt me the way some people misled our nation. Why should our nation and our peoples be misled? Why do we not give them the truth? Nixon returned to the United States, the Watergate events followed and he resigned. The date of the disengagement talks was postponed--because of Nixon's resignation--from September to October, from December to January. Then nothing happened until February 1975, when Kissinger arrived here, for the first time this year, to embark upon his abortive first attempt at a second-stage disengagement on the Egyptian front.

As a matter of face I was fed up and stopped replying to anything that was said. Why? Because it was becoming too much and intolerable. All the facts were being twisted before the Arab man in the street solely to malign Egypt and to distort Egypt's stand. This is not to be (minimized). Without Egypt--and I say this for the first time--no pan-Arab battle could have taken place. I insisted on not having a cease-fire for 17 days. [applause] I am not (boasting); I am not vain. The oil weapon was used because the United States interfered; when the United States intervened the Arab nation replied by using the oil weapon. If I had had a cease-fire before the United States intervened, the oil weapon would not have been used, and the Arabs would not have achieved their present position of being the sixth world power. However, when we had proved ourselves to the world for 17 days, including 10 days of confrontation with the United States, this became possible. I am not reminding anybody of favors; I am not vain. On the contrary, everything achieved here I regard as a victory for Syria and anything achieved in Syria is a victory for me. This is how I understand things. I did not know that the Ba'th Party thought otherwise.

Kissinger came in February. He stayed for awhile, left and came back in March this year.

V. 16 Sep 75

D 13

Eg. 11

Before he came in March I had made an agreement with him. I am announcing this for the first time so that our Palestinian brothers may hear it, and so that the Palestinian people everywhere may hear it. Let them judge for themselves. I agreed with Kissinger--and I am announcing this for the first time--that he should start a dialog with the Palestinians a week before arriving here in March. However, 10 days before he came to see me, the well-known Palestinian statement was issued. This time, the Ba'ath Party put on a fourth theatrical show, through the Palestinians, after the failure of its first three shows--the first about the cease-fire, the second about the Geneva conference, and the third about the first disengagement of forces.

I told this to Yasir 'Arafat in Riyadh. Five days before the statement was issued I received a copy of it--the copy supplied to them by Syria. The statement was written in Syria at the instigation of the Soviet Union. That statement accused Egypt of bartering a piece of land for a piece of principles. I confronted Yasir 'Arafat in Riyadh with this. I told him: This statement was written in Syria; it was written for you in Syria. I also told him of graver facts.

The PLO Executive Committee in Damascus was told: Egypt has already reached agreement with both the United States and Jordan. As for us, Syria and Palestine, we are going to be smashed. Let us make an agreement between us because Egypt has abandoned the arena.

That was the time when the joint command was set up. The Syrians started to turn the Palestinians against us. Behind all this--and I am announcing this to the world--was the Soviet Union.

The statement was written and it was issued 10 days before Kissinger arrived here. They swore at the United States. It doesn't concern me, let them swear as they like. It is a matter between them and the United States. Let them do what they like. The United States is capable of replying. However, they said that Egypt was bartering a piece of land for a piece of principles. Using their usual method--the method of terrorization which they think may sell or be acceptable--they said: The executive committee has decided to send delegations to various Arab countries. This happened after the statement was issued. The following day I told them I could not see a Palestinian delegation, but wanted the entire executive committee to come to see me. I said I did not want a delegation but the whole of the executive committee to come here to settle our accounts after the allegation about bartering a piece of land for a piece of principles. What is this? If you want to swear at the United States, do so. Please yourselves. Why swear at us?

The truth of the matter was that Syria, or the Ba'ath Party, changed its tactics. Instead of putting on the theatrical show themselves, they wanted the Palestinians to do it for them. I told these things to Yasir 'Arafat in Riyadh. He is listening to me now. I said to him in front of President Boumediene: Yasir, if someone wants to attack Egypt, let him not use the pretext of Palestine, of the Palestinian question, let him attack me directly, without involving you in the matter. I told him that in the presence of President Boumediene. I told him quite explicitly: If the Soviet Union wants to attack me, do not let it do so under the pretext of Palestine, Yasir. If Syria wants to attack, do not let it use the pretext of Palestine.

V. 16 Sep 75

D 14

EXPT

That is what I have been talking about. We are prepared, here, in these storms, to tolerate yet again the impatience of the representatives of the Palestinian people. We are prepared to tolerate the fact that they responded, but not that they were deceived. [words indistinct] They know they were told in Syria that an agreement was reached by me, the United States and Jordan--and it was a lie. They were told afterwards about alleged provisions of an agreement reached between Egypt and the United States, including secret and public clauses, last March. They and the whole world were surprised to learn that there was nothing--no agreement, no secret or public clauses. Can they not learn from these things?

They began to use the pretext of the name of Palestine. All of us know, the Arab world knows, that Palestine is a sensitive word for all Arabs. It is a cause which every Arab regards as his own. We all are prepared to die for it.

The people, here in Egypt, have endured shortages of food and clothes; from being the richest nation in the Arab world, it became the poorest without grumbling, because of the Palestinian question. It has not concluded a "separate settlement" as the Palestinians are being told by the Soviet Union or by Syria. As I said once before, the expression "separate settlement" is imported. Gromyko used the expression in a conversation with me in Al-Qanafir. I told him (?--and there is a record of the conversation): "I am sorry, I categorically reject this sort of talk: I know my Pan-Arab duty and Egypt knows its Pan-Arab responsibility."

The Ba'th Party has started to drag in the name of Palestine ever since February--I mean March--this year. The statement was issued before Kissinger came here. It was said in it that we would barter a piece of land for a piece of principles. I did not reply. I said: sorry, I am not seeing anybody; you can send me the entire executive committee for a discussion; I am not afraid of anything. Kissinger came to us. Naturally, no dialog between him and the Palestinians ever took place. For, as I said, 10 days before he arrived that statement was issued against both of us. Well, the attack on him did not concern me. They are fighting a battle against the United States and keep swearing at it, and this is getting them dividends from the Soviet Union. But I will have no part to play in this game. I tell people about their mistakes and their right moves, whether they are Americans or Soviets. The dialog we had agreed on did not take place because the Palestinians still rejected it.

When Kissinger arrived in Egypt and started work on the abortive agreement, [words indistinct]. The Palestinians mounted the hotel operation. They seized hostages in an Israeli hotel. I am stating this publicly for the first time. They sent some fedayeen to storm an Israeli hotel. Well, that was a fedayeen operation. However, instead of being a regular fedayeen operation, boats were used, this time bearing the names of Port Said and Egypt. They tried to pretend the boats were from Port Said, Egypt, with a view to influencing the Kissinger mission. The object of the exercise was that Israel should ask Kissinger: How can you be working on a second stage of a disengagement of forces while Egypt is sending people like that? Did I ever refer to this operation before? I regarded it as one of those things--an event that need not be remembered. However, Israel was more clever than they were. It became intransigent and demanded the end of the state of war.

It was agreed, ever since Nixon and Kissinger were here in the summer in 1974 and went to Israel, that the ending of the state of war was out of the question.

V. 16 Sep 75

D 15

EGYPT

My explanation of this was, and still is, that ending the state of war means inviting Israel to occupy my land--to continue occupying my land. I declared that myself and told the entire Arab world. However, let us ask: Are we to deal with this matter through clowning about, shouting and staging demonstrations? They attacked our embassy in Damascus and damaged it. Well, I could damage their embassy here! Still, we do not resort to these vulgar and anarchic methods.

We use our brains and we respect our cause, and our brains and we respect those who stood with us on 6 October, whatever they did after that. We are prepared to continue to stand with them, always.

Is it difficult for me to wreck the Syrian Embassy? Not at all. We know about the demonstration staged in Damascus under the eyes and ears of the authorities, and who staged it. This is known.

This is the story of the entry of Palestine and the pretext of Palestine in the matter.

We said no to the first agreement because Israel, of course, considered the atmosphere ripe for dividing the Arabs. It took an intransigent stand. Kissinger came to me. I told him: Sorry it is over. The first agreement failed. He continued his efforts and I met with President Ford in Salzburg. You may recall that before I met with him, I visited Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. In Syria I met with President al-Asad for more than 3 hours. I told him that I was going to meet with Ford and that Ford wanted to make another attempt to achieve disengagement on the two fronts. I told him this and informed him that if it was a question of disengagement I would agree and that I had no objection whatsoever, and that was that, with complete clarity.

We came back after the talks with Ford. Kissinger came. The theatrical began. In the previous three theatricals the Ba'th Party was the one to oppose, but this time it pushed the Palestinians to do so. It remained silent or worked covertly while the Palestinians wrote and published statements for it, saying that the Palestine cause was lost and that Egypt was out of the battle.

The Soviet Union refused to attend the signing. We went to Geneva for the sake of the Soviet Union. Seriously, we went to Geneva for the sake of the Soviet Union. I could have signed the agreement here on UN territory between the two forces in Sinai. I could have signed at kilometer 101. We went to Geneva for the sake of the Soviet Union, really. The Soviet Union, seeking excuses, nudged Syria and Syria brought in the Palestine pretext--that this agreement was a defeat for the Arab cause and that it was a political agreement.

The agreement is there and clear and I do not need to defend it because I never considered myself on the defensive at all. It is clear. We work in the daylight. I do not tell the party one thing, the Arab nation another, and the Palestinians another. I say the same things to the Americans, the Russians, the Arabs, and everybody else. Our tone is the same, our word is the same, and our policy is public and not secret.

A dispatch which I read to you last time said that the Soviet ambassador was going to meet with the Syrian foreign minister to tell him that Russia was going to refuse to go to the signing.

V. 16 Sep 75

D 16

EGYPT

The Syrian foreign minister then exchanged documents with him and told him: Here are the resolutions of the national and regional commands rejecting the agreement. It was a prearranged and theatrical. We knew that from the beginning.

I had told Yasir 'Arafat in the presence of Boumediene: Do not let the Soviet ambassador come and tell you there were public and secret clauses. Here you see there was no such thing and it ended in nothing. This time again--talk of secret clauses. The Soviet Union says that we stopped the Voice of Palestine because there was a secret agreement. I say publicly that I sent a message to Yasir 'Arafat before this telling him: Yasir, it is unbecoming, it is not appropriate that we provide a radio for you and that it insults us. He said: You are right. But the radio continued its insults. It was Mamduh Salim, the prime minister, who sent him that message. We saw that the voice of Palestine from Baghdad attacked Mamduh Salim for 3 days, using terrible insults. And their radio still [word indistinct]. I sent a message to Yasir saying: All right, I was wrong to send you a message and tell you that it was unbecoming for you to insult us when you are in our country and through our radio. When the radio does wrong again we shall make it stop. It was my fault for sending you the message since the result was that you insulted Mamduh Salim for 3 days. We stopped the Voice of Palestine so we could tell the truth and so we will not follow in the wake of outbiddings and misleading.

The Soviet Union comes out with secret articles in the agreement. We are not interested in all this talk. We have reached the question of this [word indistinct] agreement.

There is yet another very small matter I would like to mention since so far I have not mentioned three-quarters of the facts for the sake of the future and in order to preserve the meaning of comradeship of arms. I do not want to give these facts now. Three-quarters of the facts I have not yet given. I have told only one-quarter. There is one bit which I would like to dwell upon because of the early warning station they are talking about.

The warning station, they say, is used as an American base and electronic base. Those who have taken to interpretation say that this base will disclose the secrets of the Arab nation and all the world, as if there were no American satellites photographing the whole world, not only this region. It is as though this station would monitor the whole world. They kept talking about it as though it was an American base. Let me tell a simple story with which I conclude my talk to make it clear and throw light on things and give clues about who is manipulating the characters on the stage nowadays.

During the days of "Abd an-Nasir, may God have mercy on his soul, before he died he went on that secret visit in January 1970, as you have heard before. He and I were at al-Qanatir alone together and the Abu Za'bal incident took place. He asked me to get him the Soviet ambassador and the chief expert. I brought them to him. The four of us, 'Abd an-Nasir, myself, the Soviet ambassador and the chief expert got together. 'Abd an-Nasir said he wanted to visit the Soviet Union because the bombing of Abu Za'bal meant a new stage in penetrating Egypt in depth. They were not quite content to hit us but they wanted to go deep into Egypt and they were going to hit concentrations and towns all because we did not have the SAM-3 missiles.

V. 16 Sep 75

D 17

EGYPT

They had given us SAM-1 and SAM-2 since 1962 and 1964. They had not given us SAM-3, which is used against low-flying aircraft. Those two are for use against aircraft flying at high altitude. So they were flying at low altitude and thus they were able to reach any point. In those days Israel was able to say: We hit Dahshur, which is 15 minutes from Cairo. This is correct. Dahshur is 15 minutes from Cairo. Our arm is long and it can reach everywhere.

When 'Abd an-Nasir realized that this was how the situation was, he asked me to get him the Soviet ambassador. At that time he was at Al-Mahallah, may God have mercy on his soul. It was the first Vinogradov and not the second. The man came from Al-Mahallah and he brought with him the chief expert. They agreed. 'Abd an-Nasir said: I must go to Moscow. At that time, may God have mercy on his soul, he had the flu. He also had a bad heart and he was also already suffering from diabetes, but despite all this he exerted himself and went to Moscow and reached an agreement for the supply of SAM-3. During his visit they told him [about the agreement]. The Soviets seem to have a weak memory and they thought that I had no idea about all that happened during 'Abd an-Nasir's time. It was exactly like the centers of power. They were under the impression that I am stupid and that I am not paying attention. [applause]

'Abd an-Nasir returned from that journey to the Soviet Union in February 1970 in a most happy condition. He looked as if he had regained 20 years of his life because he brought things which, for the sake of friendship with the Soviets, I am not going to divulge. But let them know that I know about them. I will only disclose one part so they will know that I know. I am eager to keep my link with them as friends and not as guardians, as guardians? No. This ended a long time ago. But as friends? Yes. Among the things he brought back was this: They told him they were going to give him electronic devices because we all knew that Israel was using new electronic equipment in the electronic war for jamming and hindering and other things. This is the feature of the time. They told him: We are going to give you electronic equipment that will be installed near Cairo and its effect will reach Syria--that is, it will cover the Sinai and Israel and right up to Syria. This was one of the three things on which he reached agreement with them. I am not going to talk about the other two things. I will leave them out until the time comes.

He was extremely happy when he returned. We were lacking in the electronic warfare. Israel was coming in all the time and was saying: I am not worried about the number of Arabs, whether there are 100 million or not. I pay attention to quality and not to number. My quality is stronger and to me it is quality and not quantity. My quality is better and stronger--great electronic warfare, excellent weapons and so on and so forth--and the Arabs, whatever they have, even if there are 100 million, Israel says it can destroy them. This is what it had been saying in its propaganda to the whole world. It actually had electronic warfare equipment and we had none.

This time they said this to 'Abd an-Nasir. 'Abd an-Nasir returned as if he were 20 years younger from happiness. The equipment came afterward. It did not come until after his death.

They brought this equipment and installed it near Cairo. The Soviets have a fault.

V. 16 Sep 75

D 18

EGYPT

They do not know that our sons, the officers, read the most up-to-date material and that they follow the East and West of the world with regard to any new weapons or developments. All of them have had higher staff training. The late Field Marshal Isma'il had higher training in England just as he did in Russia. Our officers who had training in England and the United States were also trained in Russia. Others had training in Russia plus the United States or Russia plus England. They are aware of what is going on in both East and West. Weapons are published in books in the West. The weapons and wars and everything are published in books. This has become a science. This is published. Our sons read it, and they follow everything.

When they brought us that electronic equipment, they placed Russian soldiers in charge of it. Why? They said it was a top secret and no Egyptian should come near it. I said all right, for the sake of the battle. But when I give orders I expect them to be carried out. [words indistinct] of course. Our officers did not keep quiet. They went to investigate and saw the equipment themselves and found it to be quite ordinary, about 20 years old, not anything new. Its range hardly covered the middle of Sinai. It revealed practically nothing in Sinai. It could not go across Sinai and Israel and reach [words indistinct].

When I made the decision on the experts in 1972, I told them that any units they had here-- and I meant this unit in particular--must be under Egyptian command and not under Moscow's command since I was finding that I was giving the orders here, but the orders were not carried out until Moscow said so. Most often Moscow did not agree. Therefore, how could they stay among my army? This was one of the reasons that led to the decision on the experts. How can I fight when I have sections which, although not in the battlefield and not at the front, still do not take orders from me? When I issued the decision on the experts I said to them: Sell us these weapons. (But) if you insist that Soviet soldiers should (?be in charge) of them, withdraw them together with the soldiers. They said they would withdraw them together with the soldiers. I said alright.

Among the weapons here were four MiG-25 aircraft, called Foxbat in the West, an excellent aircraft. The electronics which I have mentioned do not mean that the Russians do not have new weapons. No. The Russians have just what the Americans have. But as usual, they give us only what is 20 years old. The Foxbat aircraft are well known all over the world--three times faster than sound and very reliable. I had four of them here. They said they would carry out reconnaissance for us and provide us with information, etc. Just the same, I found that they would not take off unless given orders from Moscow. Every time we gave an order, they said it was foggy or this or that. If you do not carry out orders, I said to them, goodbye. Either sell them to us--our sons will take them and receive training on how to use them just like other weapons--or withdraw them. They withdrew this electronic equipment and the four Foxbat aircraft.

The war came and they said: We will give you back the four aircraft to carry out reconnaissance. I had no reconnaissance. No one supplied information to me. The U.S. satellite--and I say this before the whole world--supplied Israel daily. No one gives me information. I have to get my information through my own aircraft. I have to fly and photograph--to fly over enemy areas where there are rocket batteries and everything else. They said no even though this aircraft takes photographs from a distance without having to enter the occupied territories.

EGYPT

They photograph from a distance. The Americans gave the Jews a similar aircraft [word indistinct] it flies right into the depth. It is out of reach of rockets. [word indistinct] It photographs and everything. The science of electronics [words indistinct] during the war, the Russians said: We will send you back the four aircraft. They have an interest in the presence of these four aircraft. Not my interest, theirs. It is their world strategy operation. I said, alright send them, if they are going to supply information to me that will be saving the lives of my children instead of my children having to go into the depths of Israel and get hit there. The aircraft came. The war ended and they did not fly.

Then we carried out the first disengagement. I said to the general commander--Husni was then in charge of the airforce--I said to him: Husni, the news are in front of us and they have their planes while our modest instruments can learn everything in the depth, but to a limited extent. We cannot reach the scope of the Jews. When the reconnaissance plane flies, the airfield observes it and everyday they send me a report of the operations. A plane flew at such and such an hour at such and such an altitude and at such and such a speed [words indistinct] and I cannot do anything. So I told Husni, my commander then: Tell them to go up and take pictures for us as the Israelis can see us from a long distance. [words indistinct] they will not come near. Not even to the buffer zone in the middle. I told him: Tell them to go up and take pictures for us. The reply came to me from Moscow: We cannot go over the Sinai. I said: But it is my land. It is my land. They say: No, we cannot go over the Sinai. Husni then told them: All right, there is no need for that. Go over our West Bank, although the Sinai is ours, Just go over the West Bank and take pictures. [Words indistinct] The whole world knows its specifications. It is written in a book printed in the world. And we know, even on the West Bank and over our forces. They said no. All right, don't go over the west Bank. Go over the east bank, over the Sharqiyah Governorate and take pictures from above the eastern governorate. Again they said: No, instructions from Moscow. In view of this I told them: I am sorry. These planes will not be allowed to fly because they have other aims. [words indistinct] It will remain grounded. It will not be allowed to fly.

When they realized that I was serious they began to withdraw them only the day before. This was Monday and this took place on Saturday. They said: We will withdraw them. I said: With my good wishes. Take them.

They have spoken about the early warning stations. The warning station is not coming with American troops on it like the station which was here with Soviet troops on it. Why did they not say then that it was Russian occupation? This station is Egyptian. I bought it with my money. An Egyptian station and the crew is Egyptian. I was the one who said: Come and be a witness between me and those people to whom you send the loaf, the gun and the plane, because they are people who I do not trust at all. This is the story of the warning station. And this was taking place and they were still withdrawing since the day before. And they had 10 days to withdraw. This is still fresh for anyone who wants to draw a lesson or who wants to create talk about us in the Arab world.

V. 16 Sep 75

D 20

EGYPT

Once again I say: What is important for the Arab nation is consultation among us all, and what is connected with the Egyptian homeland is the property of the sons of this homeland as long as [applause] we practice our national sovereignty. We do not buy anything with the rights of others and we do not accept anything which will impede the comprehensive Arab march forward.

I say again that we do not want to close open bridges or refuse an outstretched hand. Our minds and hearts are open for dialog, criticism and mutual understanding, but the final judge with regard to what concerns us is our will, our will, the pure Egyptian will. Perhaps the dimensions of what I told you throw a light on the march on which you must start work--the march of national action here and the things that confront us and face us whether from the big powers or from certain brothers in the Arab world deliberately and intentionally. With some others it might be unintentionally, but all must realize that we will not impose our guardianship on anyone. Therefore, we reject and do not allow anyone under any slogan to try to impose guardianship on our decision or on our action. I say it calmly and with frankness [applause] and my word can be heard. Demonstrations will not frighten me. The smashing of the Egyptian Embassy will not frighten us. We can easily close it down. [words indistinct]

It is not a problem. But I am not going to answer and I will not stoop so low, but when the need arises I will place new facts before the Arab nation and before our people so that we can realize who is manipulating the characters and the stage nowadays, and who has an interest in dealing a blow to the Arab nation.

They are shedding tears nowadays in the Ba'ith Party over Arab solidarity. Who is trying to strike at Arab solidarity? I would like to say something. As you have heard me at all times, I am optimistic. No one will be able to harm Arab solidarity. This is a thing of the past--indulging in clowning and outbidding. Today the stands are principled and defined. We are prepared to sit and discuss matters with everyone and place facts before everyone. That is why I say Arab solidarity will not be shaken and nothing will happen to it at all. But it is those who are agitating who will be shaken and isolated, and not us or Arab solidarity at all.

Once more I congratulate you for the people's trust in you, and as I told you our organization has become an open political organization, and when I meet you today, I am meeting not only the secretaries of the Socialist Union, but also the secretaries and the leaders of vocational trade unions, workers trade unions, and the fallahin. We meet today within an open organization, a single front, one people and one will. I implore God to lead you to success because of the march, as you can see. During the past 5 years I have written all that happened during that period and what I am telling you is only one one-millionth of the facts in hand. But we must face all this and tell these people: keep your place, stick to your size. Everyone keeps to his place and everyone sticks to his size. We do not boast to anyone about the favors we have done for anyone and our hand is extended to all.

May God lead you to success. Peace be upon you. [applause]